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UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

Office of the Chairman

13 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MILITARY REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Intelligence Required for Counterinsurgency

1. The intelligence community has reviewed the attachment to your letter of 24 April 1962 concerning intelligence required for counterinsurgency. We believe that the following measures are those most likely to orient our efforts to provide the needed intelligence:

a. I have directed that the appropriate authorities in the intelligence community responsible for drafting National Intelligence Estimates and for producing current intelligence take cognizance of the Essential Elements of Information required for counterinsurgency and see that as many of these elements are answered as may be feasible in the course of production of National Intelligence Estimates and current intelligence.

b. Most of the basic non-estimative questions posed in the EEIs are addressed in various sections of the National Intelligence Survey, notably Section 57, which deals with subversion. I have directed the Office of Basic Intelligence, CIA, to review the outline, content, and schedule for Section 57 and other pertinent sections to see that the NIS will be as responsive as possible to the EEIs and that appropriate priority may be given to sections pertaining to the countries listed by General Krulak.

c. I have also asked the intelligence authorities of the Department of State and Department of Defense to bring the Essential Elements of Information to the attention of U. S.

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diplomatic and consular posts and military commands overseas so that they may appreciate the overall pattern of our interest in developing counterinsurgency intelligence and may add to their existing requirements those not already listed among them.

d. CIA will also take action where appropriate to collect such additional information as may be required in support of the EEIs.

2. Although the measures outlined above should provide the answers to nearly all of the EEIs, I am sure that as time goes by additional EEIs will be developed, and the intelligence community will develop new assets and procedures for providing the required answers. In such a situation it is important that there be a close day-to-day working relationship between the intelligence community and action officials concerned with counterinsurgency. The intelligence community will be prepared to do what is proper and feasible in the establishment of such a working relationship.

3. We also feel that intelligence designed specifically for counterinsurgency situations would be more meaningful if viewed in the broader context of problems covered by standard current intelligence publications and National Intelligence Estimates.

(signed)

JOHN A. McCONE
Chairman

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*Take to CI
to Ray*

24 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Intelligence Required for Counterinsurgency

The attached memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, entitled "Intelligence Required for Counterinsurgency" was noted by the Special Group (CI) on 19 April.

It is the desire of the Group that the memorandum be referred to the United States Intelligence Board for whatever action the members may consider appropriate.

Maxwell D. Taylor

Attachment: Memorandum from JCS

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (CI)

SUBJECT: Intelligence Required for Counterinsurgency
Actions

1. Over the years there have been developed specific intelligence requirements essential to prosecution of "hot war" planning and operations. These requirements are fundamentally satisfied by data on the military order of battle, military strength and deployments, evaluation of enemy resources which are capable of contributing to prosecution of war, and estimates of the probable courses of enemy action. US intelligence agencies, by virtue of long experience, are fully conditioned to the production of these data, evaluations, and estimates. It is significant, however, that there is no corresponding treatment identified with counterinsurgency programming and operations, despite the unique nature of the intelligence involved.

2. This deficiency is attributable primarily to the character of counterinsurgency operations, particularly to the very broad base of participation involved. Depending, as it does, upon the coordinate application of diplomatic, military, economic, social, and educational resources, the counterinsurgency task embodies a corresponding need for an intelligence treatment which reflects the coordinate interest of all these diverse sources of power.

3. While there is now no single mechanism which brings all of these intelligence requirements into focus, in the US system, a corresponding lag is not found to exist, at least in equivalent degree, in the intelligence community of our cold war enemy. The Sino-Soviet Bloc is attacking us today, in many areas, through the medium of subversive insurgency, employing most or all of the coordinate elements

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described in the preceding paragraph. Furthermore, by virtue of their communist character, they have emphasized the development of "dialectical analyses" which, coupled with great skill at acquiring information from open societies, provide them, as a routine matter, with comprehensive cold war intelligence, covering the whole spectrum of insurgency endeavors. This circumstance accords our cold war enemy a substantial advantage.

4. The enclosure hereto seeks to meet the unfulfilled need discussed above, by bringing together the essential elements of information relating to any country or area in which an insurgency or incipient insurgency exists. It will be seen that all of the items treated are of interest to the political, military, economic, social, and psychological planners who are engaged in developing a coordinated counterinsurgency program. While some of the factors will be of much greater interest to one planner than to another, none can properly be overlooked, since all, taken together, are the essence of counterinsurgency intelligence.

5. It is recommended that, subject to review and validation, the Special Group (CI) forward the enclosed essential elements of information to the USIB as a present and continuing high priority cold war intelligence requirement.



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ENCLOSURE

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY ACTIONS

1. WHAT ARE THE PRIMARY DISCONTENTS WITHIN THE COUNTRY-ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, MILITARY, OR SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL?

- a. What popular movement, or movements, have developed for the primary purpose of alleviating specific discontents?
- b. Where are these groups located?
- c. Are the objectives or interests of these groups contrary to US objectives or interests? How? How can they be influenced?
- d. What is the present and probable future strength of popular support which is being, or can be, developed in support of alleviation of the discontent?
- e. Who are the leaders of these groups? Are there interests or objectives contrary to those of the US? How can they be influenced?
- f. To what extent have the Communists or other pertinent group, gained control of any popular movement designed to alleviate the discontent?
- g. To what extent can communists or other pertinent groups control or influence non-communist leaders of such a movement?
- h. What degree of unity exists between groups favoring a seizure or national power?
- i. What is the present degree of discontent in the country- is it approaching revolutionary intensity?

2. WHAT ARE THE SIGNIFICANT NON-COMMUNIST GROUPS WITHIN THE COUNTRY?

- a. Are their values, interests or objectives contrary to US objectives and interests? How? How can they be influenced?

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- b. What is the present and probable future strength of these factions or groups?
 - c. Who are their leaders, and what are their individual values, interests, or objectives? Are they contrary to US interests or objectives? How? How can they be influenced?
 - d. What degree of unity presently exists among the groups opposing a seizure of national power?
 - e. Where are these groups located?
 - f. To what extent are these groups or their leaders influenced or controlled by the communists or other pertinent group or nation? How?
3. WHICH PERTINENT GROUPS AND WHICH PERTINENT INDIVIDUALS WITHIN THE COUNTRY ARE ALLIES AND WHICH ARE ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL ENEMIES? WHY?
- a. Under what circumstances can these relationships change?
4. WHAT IS THE COMPARATIVE MILITARY AND/OR PARAMILITARY CAPABILITY OF THE PERTINENT GROUPS WITHIN THE COUNTRY?
- a. What is the military and/or paramilitary manpower, equipment, materiel, and probable effectiveness of the various groups?
 - b. Where is the manpower, equipment, and materiel of the various groups located?
 - c. What portion of the country's regular military capability will support the various groups?
5. HOW STRONG IS THE COMMUNIST PARTY?
- a. What positions of influence do Communists or Communist pawns hold in the government? How can they be controlled, influenced, or removed?

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6. FROM A COLD WAR STANDPOINT WHO ARE THE SIGNIFICANTLY INFLUENTIAL PERSONS IN THE POLICE, MILITARY, PUBLIC INFORMATION MEDIA, INTELLIGENCE, FINANCE, TRANSPORTATION, POWER INDUSTRIES, AND GOVERNMENT?

- a. Why are they significantly influential?
- b. Are their Motivations or actions contrary to US interests or objectives? How?
- c. To what extent are any of these men influenced or controlled by the Communists or other pertinent group or nation?
- d. How can they be influenced or controlled?

7. WHAT ARE THE INTERNAL WEAKNESSES OF THE COUNTRY-ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, MILITARY, OR SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL?

- a. Which of these weaknesses, if exploited to the optimum degree, could provide the communists or other pertinent groups, with a significant increase in power? How significant?
- b. To what extent are the communists or other pertinent group, presently exploiting this weakness, or weaknesses?

8. WHAT ARE THE SIGNIFICANT INTERNAL STRENGTHS OF THE COUNTRY-MILITARY, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, OR SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL?

- a. To what extent are the communists or other pertinent group undermining these strengths? How?

9. APPROXIMATELY WHAT PERCENTAGE OF THE POPULATION HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THE COUNTRY'S EXISTING INSTITUTIONS AND LEADERS?

10. WHAT ARE THE SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL STRENGTHS OF THE COUNTRY-MILITARY, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, OR SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL?

- a. To what extent are the communists or other pertinent group undermining these strengths? How?

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11. WHAT ARE THE SIGNIFICANT EXTERNAL WEAKNESSES OF THE COUNTRY-ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, MILITARY, SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL?
12. WHAT IS THE CUSTOMARY WAY, OR WAYS, FOR THE PEOPLE TO EXPRESS THEIR DISCONTENT AGAINST AUTHORITY? OR WHAT ARE THE CUSTOMARY FORMS OF STRUGGLE.
 - a. What form or forms of struggle are being used at this time?
 - b. What is the probable sequence of events in utilizing this form or forms of struggle?
 - c. If no form of struggle is being utilized at this time, what form or forms are most likely to be used in the future?
 - d. What is the probable form of struggle and sequence of events that would be utilized in the final phase of an attempted seizure of power?
 - e. What are the most likely alternate forms of struggle that would be used during the final phase of an attempted seizure of power with their most likely sequence of events?
 - f. What are the communists or other pertinent groups, present and future abilities to achieve the sequential objectives in the most probable sequence of events during both the preliminary and the final phase of attempts to seize power?
13. WOULD AN INTERNAL OR PERTINENT EXTERNAL ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, MILITARY, OR SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL CRISIS OR OTHER ACTION SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVE THE COMMUNIST OR OTHER PERTINENT GROUPS' CHANCES OF ACHIEVING THEIR OBJECTIVES? WHAT AND HOW?
14. WHAT ARE THE VITAL, AND GENERAL, NATIONAL FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES?
 - a. What significant political, economic, military or socio-psychological actions are being taken to achieve these objectives?
 - b. What are their potential capabilities for achieving these objectives?

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15. WHAT ARE OTHER PERTINENT NATIONS' OR GROUPS' VALUES, INTERESTS OR OBJECTIVES WHICH MAY OR DO AFFECT THE COUNTRY? HOW?
 - a. What actions are they taking or likely to take in furthering their values, interest, or objectives?
 - b. What is the likely sequence of these actions?
16. IS THE CURRENT AREA OR WORLD SITUATION CONDUCTIVE TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OR COMMUNIST OR OTHER PERTINENT GROUPS' OBJECTIVES?
 - a. Do they possess a pertinent area, or global superiority of power?
 - b. To what extent are their available forces committed?
 - c. What is the pertinent disposition of area or world public opinion?
17. WHAT ACTIVITIES OR SITUATIONS WITHIN THE COUNTRY ARE ERODING UNITED STATES PRESTIGE, INFLUENCE, OR PREROGATIVES?
 - a. If US military forces or activities are located within the country - what activities or situations are eroding US military capabilities?

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APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE

Countries to be Considered

Afghanistan
Bolivia
Burma
Brazil
Cambodia
Colombia
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Ghana
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras

Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Laos
Mali
Mexico
Pakistan
Republic of the Congo
South Korea
South Vietnam
Syria
Thailand
Venezuela

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